

#### **SIMON MAXWELL-STEWART**

#### WHO AM !?

- Physics Undergraduate,
   University of Oxford
- 8 years in Software and Data Engineering
- 2 years as Lead Data Scientist in Healthcare
- 2 years in Cybersecurity
- Presently resident "graph nerd" at BeyondTrust's Phantom Labs research team




#### AGENDA

- INTRO A mystery!
- Azure
  - Basics
  - In the weeds
  - Undocumented behaviour
- Microsoft's Position
- Possible ways to abuse
- Defence

# LET'SSCLVE A MYSTERY


**HOW DID A GUEST MAKE A SUBSCRIPTION?!** 



Guest made subscription!


#### FACTS ABOUT THE CASE

- Entra ID account credentials leaked to the dark web
- Account is a guest B2B user in tenant
- Guest user had no
  - group memberships
  - directory roles
  - RBAC roles
  - permissions granted
- Somehow guest made a subscription?




### AZURE - BASICS


#### ENTRAID




#### ENTRAID BASICS




### ENTRAID BASIC PRIVILEGES






#### ENTRA ID GROUPS



## AZURE RESOURCES BASICS



VMs


## AZURE RESOURCES RBAC ROLES


Built-in role	Description
<u>Contributor</u>	Grants full access to manage all resources, but does not allow you to assign roles in Azure RBAC, manage assignments in Azure Blueprints, or share image galleries.
<u>Owner</u>	Grants full access to manage all resources, including the ability to assign roles in Azure RBAC.
Reservations Administrator	Lets one read and manage all the reservations in a tenant
Role Based Access Control Administrator	Manage access to Azure resources by assigning roles using Azure RBAC. This role does not allow you to manage access using other ways, such as Azure Policy.
<u>User Access Administrator</u>	Lets you manage user access to Azure resources.
Reader	View all resources, but does not allow you to make any changes.

Source: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/built-in-roles

### AZURE - INTO THE WEEDS

docs





# A LESS WELL UNDERSTOOD FEATURE

**BILLING AGREEMENTS** 

#### BILLING AGREEMENTS

- Two ways to be billed for direct agreements
  - EA is legacy
  - MCA is replacement

Source: MCA docs, EA docs


#### Enterprise Agreement



#### Microsoft Customer Agreement




#### Owner Contributor — Creator — Reader Billing Account Contains Owner Contributor — Assigned — Creator — .... Reader Billing Role Billing Profile User Contains Owner Contributor Creator — Reader Manager Invoice Section Contains - Creator — Subscription



#### EA VISUALIZED BY MICROSOFT

Resources



Source: microsoft.com

#### BILLING ROLES

#### EA:

- Enterprise Administrator
- Enterprise Administrator (read only)
- EA purchaser
- Department Administrator
- Department Administrator (read only)
- Account Owner

#### MCA:


- Billing account owner
- Billing account contributor
- Billing account reader
- Billing profile owner
- Billing profile contributor
- Billing profile reader
- Invoice manager
- Invoice section owner
- Invoice section contributor
- Invoice section reader
- Azure subscription creator

### AZURE - UNDOCUMENTED BEHAVIOUR

# BILLING ROLES ARE WELL WITH WELL WITH A STATE OF THE STAT

**BILLING ROLES GRANT PRIVILEGE ACROSS TENANTS?!** 

#### **CROSS-TENANT BILLING PRIVILEGES**




#### HOMETENANT

Home > Subscriptions > Subscriptions << Default Directory Global administrators can manage all subscriptions in this list by updating their policy setting here. View list of subscriptions for which you have role-based access control (RBAC) permissions to manage Azure resources. To view subscriptions for which you have billing access, click here Showing subscriptions in Default Directory directory. Don't see a subscription? Switch directories ∠ Se... Subscriptions : Filtered (2 of 2) My role == all Status == all +


¬ Add filter Subscription name ↑↓ Azure subscription 1 ... Normal Sub ...

# Create a subscription ... Basics Advanced Budget Tags Review + create Subscription directory Industries Root management group Cannot specify management group since target subscription directory is different than the current directory.



#### RESOURCE TENANT

> Help



11/08

Current cost

CA\$21.39

11/09

11/10

11/11

11/12

11/13



Subscription name: GuestMakesSub

: Owner

: 27%

: Azure Plan

My role

Secure Score

Plan

11/14

# WHAT WAS MICROSOFT'S VIEW OF THIS?

#### MICROSOFT'S POSITION


- Confirmed this behaviour was intended as a feature
- No controls exist, at time of meeting, to prevent guests using billing role privilege across tenant.\*
- Not a vulnerability as subscriptions are a security boundary in Azure

\*This was updated and Microsoft now proposes controls. We will cover at the end.

#### CAN GUEST MADE SUBSCRIPTIONS BE ABUSED?

#### UNIQUE PRIVILEGE MODEL

 Guest only has access to their subscription... and it's empty :(




# COMPLETELY FAILED ATTEMPTS

## BILLING ATTACK? NO!


- Who ends up paying for this new subscription?
- Guests billing account gets billed for subscription and all resources created inside of it
- No way to use this for guests to offload costs

### SUBSCRIPTION TO SUBSCRIPTION? NO!

- Subscriptions purpose is to be logical containers!
- Worst attacker can do: request one subscription transferred to guest controlled one





# ENUMERATE THINGS GUESTS NORMALLY CAN'T!



#### ENUMERATION? KINDA

- Turns out we can list the root management group admins that our subscription belongs to!
- There is a control to prevent this...
- External Identities | External collaboration settings





# AZURE POLICY

## POLICY? KINDA

Home > Policy | Assignments >

#### Assign policy ....

Basics Parameters	Remediation Non-compliance messages Review + create
Scope	
Scope *	GuestMakesSub
	Learn more about setting the scope 🖸
Exclusions	GuestMakesSub/GUESTMADE_group
Resource selectors (Expand)	Using resource selectors, you can further refine this assignment's applicability by targeting specific subset of resources. Expand to learn more.
Basics	
Policy definition *	GuestsCompliance
Overrides (Expand)	Using overrides, you can change the effects or referenced versions of definitions for all or a subset of resources evaluated by this assignment. Expand to learn more.
Assignment name * ①	GuestsCompliance
Description	
Policy enforcement ①	Enabled


#### **Available Definitions**

Search		Poli	icy type : All policy types	Category : All cate	gories
	Policy name ↑↓		Latest version ( ↑↓	Category ↑↓	Type ↑↓
	Microsoft Managed Control 1158 - Security A	uth	1.0.0	Regulatory Compli	Static
	Bot Service should have local authentication	met	1.0.0	Bot Service	BuiltIn
	Review cloud service provider's compliance w	ith	1.1.0	Regulatory Compli	BuiltIn
	Enable logging by category group for micros	oft.w	1.0.0	Monitoring	BuiltIn
	API Management should have username and	pas	1.0.1	API Management	BuiltIn
	Establish usage restrictions for mobile code to	echn	1.1.0	Regulatory Compli	BuiltIn
	Deploy export to Log Analytics workspace for	Mic	4.1.0	Security Center	BuiltIn
	Microsoft Managed Control 1407 - Maintena	nce	1.0.0	Regulatory Compli	Static
	Keys using elliptic curve cryptography should	hav	1.0.1	Key Vault	BuiltIn
	Azure Application Gateway should be deployed	ed w	1.0.0	Network	BuiltIn
	Secure the interface to external systems		1.1.0	Regulatory Compli	BuiltIn
	Observe and report security weaknesses		1.1.0	Regulatory Compli	BuiltIn
	Container registries should have repository so	оре	1.0.0	Container Registry	BuiltIn
	SQL databases should have vulnerability findi	ngs	4.1.0	Security Center	BuiltIn
	[Preview]: Prevents init containers from being	ran	1.0.0-preview	Kubernetes	BuiltIn


### MANAGED IDENTITIES

# SUBSCRIPTION TO DIRECTORY? YES!

- Managed Identities are a way we can make Azure Resources that can authenticate against the directory.
- Can be user managed, or follow life cycle of resource
- Inserts Service Principal identity into directory




### PIVOT




#### DEEPEN PERSISTENCE

- We can use a well known technique of adding attacker controlled OIDC federated credentials (source: @dirkjanm)
- Doing this allows us to deepen persistence; attacker controlled identity separate from original guest



#### PIVOT! PIVOT!



### CONDITIONAL ACCESS POLICY


# MORE DIRECTORY SHENANIGANS!

Device based abused :)

Home > Virtual machines > Create a virtual machine >

#### Install an Extension


Azure AD based Windows Login



Microsoft Corp.

This extension configures your Windows VM for Azure AD based login.

#### PORTAL VIEW



## DEVICE JOINED ENTRAID!

Administrator: Command Prompt	-	×
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19045.5131] (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.		^
C:\Users\guestguest>dsregcmd /status		
++   Device State ++		
AzureAdJoined : YES EnterpriseJoined : NO DomainJoined : NO Device Name : GuestVM		
++   Device Details +		
DeviceId: 82c97869-d9cc-4cce-84a8-e50e1884c27c Thumbprint: 03B9FDFE21FF89FD96922D421B48B53D70294E20  DeviceCertificateValidity: [ 2024-11-18 23:06:09.000 UTC 2034-11-18 23:36:09.000 UTC ]  KeyContainerId: 8a6b823a-6a9b-42ca-980e-c35a9ebec21b  KeyProvider: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider  TpmProtected: NO  DeviceAuthStatus: SUCCESS		
++   Tenant Details +		
		~

#### WHAT'S THE SIGNIFICANCE?

 "Devices (endpoints) are a crucial part of Microsoft's Zero Trust concept. Devices can be Registered, Joined, or Hybrid Joined to Azure AD.

Conditional Access uses the device information as one of the decisions criteria to allow or block access to services."

https://aadinternals.com/post/devices/

Dr. Nestori Syynimaa aka @DrAzureAD

#### DYNAMIC DEVICE GROUPS

- Potential security risk: devices can be members of dynamic groups
- Similar concept as known dynamic group abuse for users.
- For instance, the target organization may have setup conditional access based on dynamic groups like "Windows Workstations", "VPN Machines" etc.

Example: (device.displayName -startsWith "AVD")

### STEALING DEVICE IDENTITIES!

"Stealing (and faking) device identities allows threat actors to access the target tenant using the identity of the stolen or faked device. This may allow evading device based Conditional Access (CA) policies, as the compliance of the device is assessed against the original device."

https://aadinternals.com/post/deviceidentity/

PS C:\Users\guestguest> Export-AADIntLocalDeviceTransportKey WARNING: Running as LOCAL SYSTEM. You MUST restart PowerShell to restore GuestInsecureVM\guestguest Transport key exported to 3c592aac-d4ff-45b2-9b4d-cf50ded41325\_tk.pem PS C:\Users\guestguest> dir Directory: C:\Users\guestguest LastWriteTime Length Name Mode ----- ----5:30 PM d----11/19/2024 .azure 3D Objects 11/19/2024 7:03 AM d-r---AADInternals-master 1:20 AM 11/22/2024 d-r---7:03 AM 11/19/2024 Contacts d-r---11/21/2024 9:44 PM Desktop 9:34 PM 11/21/2024 Documents d-r---7:42 AM Downloads 11/19/2024 d-r---Favorites 7:03 AM 11/19/2024 d-r--d-r---7:03 AM 11/19/2024 Links 7:03 AM Music d-r---11/19/2024 7:03 AM OneDrive d-r---11/19/2024 **Pictures** 7:03 AM d-r---11/19/2024 7:03 AM d-r---11/19/2024 Saved Games 7:03 AM Searches d-r---11/19/2024 11/19/2024 7:03 AM Videos d-r---1:21 AM 2524 3c592aac-d4ff-45b2-9b4d-cf50ded41325.pfx 11/22/2024 1708 3c592aac-d4ff-45b2-9b4d-cf50ded41325\_tk.pem -a----11/22/2024 1:21 AM 11/22/2024 1:20 AM 1846300 master.zip

## BEST DEFENCE

#### STOP ROOT GAUSE!

 TBD if this works in all cases, some evidence this now works for MCA accounts

#### Subscriptions | Manage policies

Exempted Users

Search user name or email:

Xr Feedback	
Configure policy settings for Azure subscription operations.	
Subscription leaving Microsoft Entra tenant:	
This policy controls if users can change the Microsoft Entra tenant of Azure subscriptions from this tenant to a different one. Learn	more 🗗
Allow everyone (default)	
O Permit no one	
Subscription entering Microsoft Entra tenant:	
This policy controls if users can bring Azure subscriptions from a different Microsoft Entra tenant into this tenant. Learn more 🗗	
Allow everyone (default)	
Permit no one	

Search by name or email address


These are special users who can bypass the policy definitions and will always be able to take subscriptions out of this Microsoft Entra ID directory or bring subscriptions into this one.

#### CONTROLS!

- Can stop unwanted enumeration attacks
- Generally make guests have as least privilege as possible

Home > External Identities

#### External Identities | External collaboration settings



Allow invitations only to the specified domains (most restrictive)

#### BE AWARE! GUEST API PERMISSION PHISHING

- Malicious collaborators could ask for a privileged API permission to be assigned to a service principal
  - RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory
- Guests may have teams access, which threat actor could leverage...
  - "Hey! plz unblock me friend:) just need an admin to grant this app API permission"
  - Attacker can name Managed Identity: "NotSus HR"
- In tenants where this kind of guest collaboration is somewhat routine, ensure admins verify the provenance of all service principals they are being asked to add privileges to

### DEFENCE, DEFENCE, DEFENCE!

- Monitoring guest made subscriptions
- Review usage of broad dynamic device groups and conditional access policies of devices
- Some alerts can pop up in Security Center

# QUESTIONS?

SIMON MAXWELL-STEWART SR. SECURITY RESEARCH @ BEYONDTRUST GITHUB: @KIDTRONNIX