IS YOUR PHONE SPYING ON YOU? AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF VULNERABILITIES IN CISCO VOIP PHONES

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BIO / BALÁZS BUCSAY

- Over two decades of offensive security experience
- 15+ years of research and consultancy
- Software Reverse Engineer
- Started learning assembly at the age of 13
- Previously worked at NCC Group and Vodafone
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MANTRA INFORMATION SECURITY


MANTRA
INFORMATION SECURITY

- Boutique consultancy
- Decades of experience and excellence
 - Specialised training delivery (Software Reverse Engineering, Ransomware Detection, ...)
 - Cloud, CI/CD, Kubernetes reviews
 - Red Teaming, EASM, Infrastructure testing
 - Web application and API assessments
 - Reverse-engineering, embedded devices and exploit development
 - **-** ...
- Full stack consultancy: from identifying vulnerabilities to implementing fixes

https://mantrainfosec.com

BOOK: THIS IS A SCAM! IT WILL NOT STAND!





- Empower others to protect themselves
- 11 gripping and educational real-world stories
- Download and share it freely
- Absolutely free of charge
- Perfect for a non-technical audience


https://mantrainfosec.com/scambook



JOINT EFFORT

- Balazs Bucsay Mantra Information Security SRE skills
- Liviu Rombaut & Peter Lemmens Davinsi Labs HW skills

CHIP-OFF MASTER: LIVIU ROMBAUT







THE STARTING POINT

- **Scope:** Cisco IP Phone 6851, 7841, 8861
- Dumped the running firmware
 - Stock firmware available from Cisco's official website
- Identified that all three models use the same firmware version
- These are very well-known devices.
 - Could be found in nearly every office in the city



THE MINDSET

- Initial Assumptions:
 - Cisco product: MUST to be secure by default
 - Widespread deployment: MUST have undergone extensive testing
- Baseline: Won't be able to find anything

CISCO IP PHONE 8861





CISCO IP PHONE 7841





CISCO IP PHONE 6851





DO YOU RECOGNISE HIM? - 8851





HOW ABOUT HIM? - 8851





REALITY

- I couldn't have been more wrong.
- Several CVEs were identified within just 10 days:
 - CVE-2024-20357: Cisco IP Phone Unauthorized Access Vulnerability
 - CVE-2024-20376: Cisco IP Phone DoS Vulnerability
 - CVE-2024-20378: Cisco IP Phone Information Disclosure Vulnerability



BUGS: INFORMATION LEAK

- Access: Unauthenticated
- Type: Exposed Logs
- Description:
 - /var/log/messages accessible over http://[IP]/log/messages
 - Information goldmine (crashes with verbose output)



BUGS: DENIAL OF SERVICE (CVE-2024-20357)

- Access: Unauthenticated
- **Type:** Buffer overflow
- Description:
 - The proof-of-concept successfully crashed one of the main processes
 - Repeated crashes triggered a device reboot



BUGS: .BSS BUFFER OVERFLOW (CVE-2024-20376)

- Access: Unauthenticated
- **Type:** Buffer overflow
- Description:
 - Overwrites initialized data in the .BSS section
 - Not a stack overflow, but the .BSS contains sensitive data.
 - Repeated exploitation leads to device reboots
 - Note: the XML service must be enabled for this issue to be exploitable



BUGS: INFORMATION LEAK? (CVE-2024-20378)

- Access: Unauthenticated what else?
- Type: Packet capture
- Description:
 - Three endpoints that can be called:
 - Start tcpdump on all interfaces
 - Stop tcpdump
 - Download the resulting .pcap file
- Do not forget, we are talking about VoIP Phones



SNIFFING DEMO



THE IMPACT

- Millions of devices were and likely still are vulnerable worldwide
- No OTA or automatic firmware upgrade mechanism
- Patched firmware was released on May 1, 2024
- These vulnerabilities are likely just the tip of the iceberg



A FEW QUESTIONS REMAIN

- Do we really believe these vulnerabilities hadn't been discovered before?
- Would the NSA truly allow the POTUS to use this firmware if they weren't aware of its risks?
 - Ignorance? Incompetence? Something else?
- What does this say about the current state of embedded device security?



THE RESEARCHER MINDSET

"If you're not uncomfortable, you're not learning."

- Let's talk a bit about the researcher mindset!
- It starts with curiosity, a drive to understand how things work
- It is more about mentality than knowledge
- That means you don't need to "know everything" to begin
- Most importantly: Research doesn't have to be groundbreaking to be valuable



THE BOTTLENECKS

"Research begins where curiosity outweighs fear."

- Success rate is low: think 95% failure, 5% success (ballparked)
- There are no guaranteed results price of the emotional highs
 - Tried bug bounty? You've probably felt the grind
- Impostor syndrome? You're not the only one. Don't assume others don't feel it too
- Burnout is real a bad streak can make you want to quit



THE EMOTIONAL ROLLERCOASTER

- Continuous failures can lead to constant lows, which may contribute to burnout
- On the flip side, occasional successes offer a drive and create significant emotional highs
- A few examples:
 - Application crash found Exciting!
 But wait... not exploitable? A letdown.
 - Critical risk identified Great!
 But wait... already published as a duplicate? Disheartening.



THE ASSUMPTIONS

"Never mistake reputation for security."

- "It's been tested a thousand times" do I need to give you an example?
- "They must have tested this" Ignore this thought, get used to failure
- "Trusted product/service" by whom, and why?
- Big brand ≠ secure. Popular doesn't mean bulletproof

LINEAR MINDSET




RESEARCH

RESULT

CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR

RESEARCH MINDSET







THE SUPPORT

"Trivial doesn't mean easy."

- Just because something looks simple doesn't mean the research was
- Being jealous won't move you forward learning will
- If you appreciate someone's research, say something!
 - Positive or constructive feedback helps more than silence



THE RESPONSIBILITY

"Discovery is knowledge; resolution is value."

- Ethics in research is vital but who are we ultimately responsible to?
 - Vendors (often large corporations)? Are we demanding responsibility or just making sure no one loses money?
 - Clients (to the vendors)?
 - End-users (everyday people who bear the risk)?



THE RESPONSIBILITY

- Types of Disclosure:
 - Responsible Disclosure: Most effective when the vendor is cooperative and acts in good faith
 - Full Disclosure: Seen by some as irresponsible work well for negligent or unresponsive vendors
 - Non-Disclosure: Choosing silence. May happen when you're disillusioned or burned out
 - Commercial Disclosure: Selling to bug bounty platforms or third parties (e.g., Oday brokers)



CLOSING NOTES

"Comparison is the thief of joy."

- Never doubt yourself there's no value in that
- Don't build imaginary boundaries they'll only stop you from trying
- Stop reaching up to others comparison is a game you can't win
- Make time. "Waste" it on research and learning. That's how growth happens



Q&A

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