



Thomas V Fischer

Threats versus Capabilities

Building Better Detect and Respond Capabilities





- › **Current focus is SecOps**
- › **25+ years experience in InfoSec**
 - › Security Advocate, Architect & Threat Researcher focused on Data Protection
 - › Spent number years in corporate IR team positions

I am @Fvt...

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Neo let me tell you why you're here.....




Threat Actors **Get In**






People






People



Procedures



People



Procedures



Technology



Our **failures** are a consequence of many factors, but possibly one of the most important is the fact that society operates on the theory that **specialization** is the key to success, not realizing that **specialization** precludes **comprehensive thinking**

Buckminster Fuller



Our **failures** are a consequence of many factors, but possibly one of the most important is the fact that ~~society~~ operates on the theory that specialization is the key to success, not realizing that specialization precludes **comprehensive thinking**

Security




Our **failures** are a consequence of many factors, but possibly one of the most important is the fact that ~~society~~ operates on the theory that ~~specialization~~ is the key to success, not realizing that ~~specialization~~ precludes **comprehensive thinking**

A red line originates from the word "specialization" in the text above and points down to the "Security" box.

Security

A blue line originates from the word "comprehensive thinking" in the text above and points down to the "Tools" box.

Tools



Vendors Want You to Believe




Detec

t

Prote
ct



MITRE ATT&CK™



The Issue?

- Too focused on specific **threat actors**
- Yeah so you cover a bunch of TTPs...



Open and fair evaluations based on ATT&CK®

While organizations know that robust security solutions are imperative, determining what is no easy feat. There is often a disconnect between security solution providers and the threats they are particularly related to how these solutions address real-world threats.

Our mission is to bridge this gap by enabling users to better understand and defend against adversary behaviors through a transparent evaluation process and publicly available data, leading to a safer world for all.

Search Participants

Sentin|

SentinelOne

Enterprise Adversaries Participated: APT3, APT29, Carbanak+FIN7, Wizard Spider and Sandworm




SOLVABLE?

What Can be Done Differently?



Threat modelling works to identify, communicate, and understand threats and mitigations within the context of protecting something of value



RISK

approach

But Does It Work?



**Incident
Responder**



**Detection
Engineer**



Want Practical Approach

Wants & Needs

1

**Threat
Driven
Approach**

2

**Understand
Capabilities**

3

**Helps Define
What/How
Detection is
Achieved**

4

**Identifies
How Effective
Response Is**

Premise

1

What Threat is the Organization Concerned with

2

Identify the Assets

3


Determine Detection Data Points

4

Determine Response Actions and Data Points


The Approach


- Use a Mind Map (*or whatever floats your boat*)
- Use NIST Incident Response Framework
 - Identify
 - Detect
 - Respond





Using the Mind Map


- Mind map is primarily a reference graph
- Graph view of requirements based on the 3 domains:
 - Identify.Asset Management
 - Detect
 - Respond
- You can use the graph to quickly identify where telemetry, information or activities belong














Reference Sheet

- Requirements is the reference 'manual'
- Inventories all the data points assigned to a threat/risk solutions mapping
- Helps identify what data points need a different stages
- Helps to map requirements for identifying and selecting tools
- Provides the requirements when building a solution or element of a solution
- Provides a method to establish a gap analysis (what we have vs desired state)

Gap Analysis How-To

- Determined by completing "Provided by" & "Used by" columns
- Fill-in columns based on the availability and use of the data point
- Blanks are gaps we need to address

Fill-in based on what we have today! To identify gaps

NIST Category	What?	Type	Sub-Type	Data Point	Action (if any)	Provided by (1:M)	Used by (1:M)	Comments
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		Name				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		email				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		username				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		team				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User						
Identify.AM	▼ User	User						
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		location				
Identify.AM	▼ User	Privileges [1:M]		privilege				
Identify.AM	▼ Gatekeeper	Owners [1:M]		owner	owned by User	github		
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		hostname				

Gap Analysis How-To: Provided by

Provided by

1. tell us where the information comes from (can be multiple sources): a tool (Carbon black); an app
2. Populate with source tools/apps that provide the data
3. Data can come from multiple sources

Fill-in based on what we have today! To identify gaps

NIST Category	What?	Type	Sub-Type	Data Point	Action (if any)	Provided by (1:M)	Used by (1:M)	Comments
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		Name				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		email				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		username				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		team				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User						
Identify.AM	▼ User	User						
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		location				
Identify.AM	▼ User	Privileges [1:M]		privilege				
Identify.AM	▼ Gatekeeper	Owners [1:M]		owner	owned by User	github		
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		hostname				

Gap Analysis How-To: Used by

Used by

1. tell us where the information is used (can be multiple sources): Tool (carbon black), Incident Ticket (XSOAR)
2. Populate where the data is being used
3. Data can be used in multiple places

Fill-in based on what we have today! To identify gaps

NIST Category	What?	Type	Sub-Type	Data Point	Action (if any)	Provided by (1:M)	Used by (1:M)	Comments
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		Name				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		email				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		username				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		team				
Identify.AM	▼ User	User						
Identify.AM	▼ User	User						
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		location				
Identify.AM	▼ User	Privileges [1:M]		privilege				
Identify.AM	▼ Gatekeeper	Owners [1:M]		owner	owned by User	github		
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		hostname				

Gap Analysis How-To: Example

- Example below shown
- We note that the detect telemetry for process info is primarily provided by EPP & EDR
- Detection uses name, md5 & sha256 from process info to trigger events

NIST Category	What?	Type	Sub-Type	Data Point	Provided by (1:M)	Used by (1:M)	Comments
Identify.AM	Sources	MDM		mobileir			
Detect	Telemetry	Proces Info		name	EPP, EDR	EPP, SIEM Alerts	
Detect	Telemetry	Proces Info		path	EPP, EDR		
Detect	Telemetry	Proces Info		pid	EDR		
Detect	Telemetry	Proces Info		cmd-line args	EDR		
Detect	Telemetry	Proces Info		modules	EDR		
Detect	Telemetry	Proces Info		regmods	EDR		
Detect	Telemetry	Proces Info		start time	EDR		
Detect	Telemetry	Proces Info	FileHash	MD5	EPP, EDR	EPP, SIEM Alerts	
Detect	Telemetry	Proces Info	FileHash	SHA256	EPP, EDR	EPP, SIEM Alerts	

Name & Path is provided by both EPP and EDR

Filehash are used by the detect phase to trigger events

NIST Category	What?	Type	Sub-Type	Data Point	Action (if any)	Provided by (1:M)	Used by (1:M)	Comments
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		Name		SNOW, HRDB	SOAR, Axonius	
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		email		SNOW, HRDB	SOAR, Axonius	
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		username	Defined by ????	AD, SNOW, HRDB	ES, SOAR	
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		team		HRDB	Axonius	
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		business unit		HRDB	Axonius	
Identify.AM	▼ User	User		location		SNOW, HRDB	Axonius	
Identify.AM	▼ User	Privileges [1:M]		privilege		AD, IDAM		
Identify.AM	▼ Gatekeeper	Owners [1:M]		owner	owned by User	GitHub	metadata_bot	
Identify.AM	▼ Gatekeeper	cloud service		aws		GitHub	metadata_bot	
Identify.AM	▼ Gatekeeper	cloud service		gcp		GitHub	metadata_bot	
Identify.AM	▼ Gatekeeper	cloud service		azure		GitHub	metadata_bot	
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		hostname		SNOW, AD, SCCM, JamfPro	Axonius, CB, JamfProtect, SOAR	
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		location		SNOW	Axonius	
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		MAC		SNOW, CB, JamfPro	SOAR	
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		EDRsensordid		CB	SOAR	
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		IP	part of IP_ranges	SCCM, JamfPro, Pulse, CB, Defender,	ES, SOAR	*check if defender prov
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		domain		AD, CB, Defender	ES, SOAR	
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		install time		SNOW		
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	OS		version		SCCM, SNOW, JamfPro, CB, Defender	SOAR	*check if defender prov
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	OS		patch version		SCCM, SNOW, JamfPro		
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	User		owned by	owned by User	SNOW	SOAR	
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Endpoint		purpose		SNOW		build, user, ...
Identify.AM	▼ Endpoint	Asset tag [1:M]		asset tag		SNOW		keep history
Identify.AM	▼ Network	Network		IP_ranges				
Identify.AM	▼ Network	Network		network segement name				
Identify.AM	▼ Network	Network		topology				
Identify.AM	▼ Network	User		owner	owned by User	GitHub		
Identify.AM	▼ Sources	People		HRDB		HRDB		

NIST Category	What?	Type	Sub-Type	Data Point	Action (if any)	Provided by (1:M)	Used by (1:M)	Comments
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info		name		CB, JamfProtect, Defender, winlogbeat	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info		path		CB, JamfProtect, Defender, winlogbeat	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info		pid		CB, JamfProtect, winlogbeat		
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info		cmd-line args		CB, JamfProtect, winlogbeat	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info		modules		CB, JamfProtect	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info		regmods		CB, JamfProtect	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info	FileHash	start time		CB, JamfProtect, winlogbeat		
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info	FileHash	MD5		CB, JamfProtect, Defender, winlogbeat	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info	FileHash	SHA256		CB, JamfProtect, winlogbeat	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info		parent	is a process info	CB, JamfProtect, winlogbeat	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info		child	is a process info	CB, JamfProtect	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info		context username	links to User>username	CB, JamfProtect, winlogbeat	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info	NetConn	Dest. IP		CB, Corelight	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info	NetConn	Dest. Port		CB, Corelight	ES-SIEM	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info	NetConn	DNS		CB, Corelight	ES	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Proces Info	NetConn	Protocol				
Detect	▼ Telemetry	User		username	links to User>username	CB, JamfProtect, Defender	ES	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	File Detection		Name	subset of Process Info	CB, JamfProtect, Defender	SOAR, CB	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Network info		Source IP	belongs to Network>IP_ranges	Corelight, winlogbeat, Firewall	ES	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Network info		Source Port		Corelight, Firewall	ES	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Network info		Protocol		Corelight, Firewall	ES	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Network info		Dest IP		Corelight, winlogbeat, Firewall	ES	
Detect	▼ Telemetry	Network info		Dest Port		Corelight, Firewall	ES	
Detect	▼ Tools	Tool		yara			Stairwell	
Detect	▼ Tools	ATT&CK		Techniques				
Detect	▼ Tools	ATT&CK		Procedures				
Detect	▼ Tools	EPP		Defender		Defender	ES, XSOAR	
Detect	▼ Tools	EPP		Jamf protect		Jamf Protect	ES, XSOAR	



Understanding of Organization's Capabilities



Focus Making Good Tooling Decisions



Framework to PoC New Tools

“identify **pertinent information**,
prioritize it, draw conclusions from it,
and communicate it...”

Amy E. Herman



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- › keybase.io/fvt