Developer Centered Security

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Security Architecture Oracle Cloud Infrastructure







# Usable Security Primer

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

# Ugly

#### Security Alert



Information you exchange with this site cannot be viewed or changed by others. However, there is a problem with the site's security certificate.

The security certificate was issued by a company you have not chosen to trust. View the certificate to determine whether you want to trust the certifying authority.

The security certificate date is valid.



The security certificate has a valid name matching the name of the page you are trying to view.

Do you want to proceed?

Yes



View Certificate

### System in theory



#### System in practice



# Good



#### Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **example.net** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). Learn more

NET::ERR\_CERT\_COMMON\_NAME\_INVALID

Advanced

Back to safety

# Summary

- Users are part of the system
- System design
  - Secure defaults
  - Not involving if possible
  - Clear and transparent information



# **Developer Centered Security**

Developers are humans too

#### Development stack



#### Development stack



# Who are developers?

And what do they do?

Source: O'Reilly Media

Techniques for Multicore and Multithreaded Programming Parallel and Concurrent Programming in Haskell

**O'REILLY**®

Simon Marlow

Source: O'Reilly Media



**O'REILLY**®

Yakov Fain, Victor Rasputnis, Anatole Tartakovsky & Viktor Gamov

Source: The Practical Dev



Source: The Practical Dev



## Everyday developers

- Coding as a specialized skill
- Separate from the rest of the lifecycle



## Everyday developers

It is all about coding now



# Third-party components

- Component integration
- Effortless, fast, cheap
- Amount of:
  - documentation
  - settings
  - options
  - defaults



# Third-party components

Direct and indirect usage



# Third-party components

Source: The Practical Dev



O RLY?

@ThePracticalDev

# Case study

Webhooks

#### Before webhooks



#### With webhooks



#### Setup



- Callback URL - Event type - Scope - Other options Service

Developer

#### Webhooks in action

```
"contacts": [{
  "profile": {
    "name": "Olgierd Pieczul"
  },
  "wa_id": "16315551234"
}],
"messages": [{
  "timestamp": "1518694235",
  "text": {
    "body": "Please sign me up ..."
  },
 "type": "text"
}]
```



### Why webhooks?



- Service *defines* controls
- Consumer *implements*
- No direct service impact
- Study of 10 services
  - API
  - Documentation
  - Code samples

#### Source address

- What this is for?
- Does it change?
- Poor mechanism
  - Layers, proxies
  - Shared infrastructure
  - Multiple services



213.25.234.34

213.25.234.39

213.25.234.82

213.25.234.85

# Source address with DNS

- How often?
- Integrated or manual?
- Plaintext

\$ dig a +short service.com 213.25.234.34 213.25.234.39 213.25.234.82 213.25.234.85

#### TLS

- 20% recommend using TLS
- Examples in documentation often use 'http' URLs
- Sample code uses plaintext endpoints







# Authentication: Secret URL

"As a best practice, provide a callback URL that's not guessable and make sure you can easily change it."

- Service documentation

https://consumer.net/callback/foobar99

#### Authentication: HMAC



# **HMAC** confusion

"For added security, webhooks sent to applications are signed so they can be verified as originating from Service and unaltered in transit." "Service can optionally sign the webhook events it sends to your endpoints by including a signature in each event's header."

## HMAC: keys, docs and samples

#### Key generation

- Just one service provides sample
- None generates the key for the consumer
- Docs with web UI and trivial key
- · Reuse of API key

No public key signatures

#### Tools and code samples

- · Missing HMAC verification
- · Hardcoded Key
- Testing tool that requires turning off authentication

### A Day in the Life



### A Day in the Life



#### Best practices

#### Guidance

Avoid lazy security controls Explain risks clearly Do not provide insecure options Do not delegate security tasks Production quality code samples Isolated, transparent debugging

# Summary

- Humans are part of the system security
- Developers are new users
- APIs, docs, samples are developer interfaces
- Poor developer interfaces tricks them into security bugs
- Solutions are out there and easy



# Thank you!

**Questions?**